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abstract: In this paper, I explore the educational and political dimensions of pleas-
ure in Plato’s philosophy. The main texts analysed are the Republic and the Laws. Plato 
shows clearly the significant role that pleasure plays both in individual human lives 
(from birth to death) and in society. Importantly, this makes it possible to judge the 
moral condition of both the individual and the state, and to philosophically justify this 
judgement.
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1. introduction
It is well known that in his works Plato shows two philosophical projects 
of the political system. One of them is in the Republic (Politeia), and it 
is constructed, so to speak, from ‘top to bottom’. He presents there a 
specific conception of the human being as composed from the spiritual 
and the corporeal. The first of these is a combination of three elements, 
and assigned to it is the ruling of the body. Thanks to the principle of 
homoiosis, Plato shows that a polis reflects the structure of the soul above 
all through social division. The second project is in the Laws (Nomoi), 
and it is depicted as it were from ‘the bottom’. As the title of the work 
shows, it is formed as a legal model, which has to guarantee that people 
in the polis will live a happy life.
One of the most important factors in the political field is education 
(paideia), which is necessary to form an appropriate relationship with 
pleasure in the process of learning. At the beginning of the Laws it is 
already said that:
 * This research has been financed from grant nr. 2011/01/B/HS1/1018 from the 
National Science Centre, Poland.
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When men investigate legislation, they investigate almost exclusively pleas-
ures and pains as they affect society and the character of the individual. 
Pleasure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a 
man draws the right amount from the right one at the right time, he lives 
a happy life; but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, his life will 
be rather different. State and individual and every living being are on the 
same footing here.  1
As can be seen, Plato puts emphasis on knowledge of two subjects – 
pleasure and pain, and this knowledge concerns their sources, their 
appropriateness in time and their quantity  2. It is undoubtedly connected 
with Plato’s view of human nature, and he recognises it as something 
profoundly human (anthro-peion malista), since it comprises not only the 
two above-mentioned sensations but also desire (Leg. 732e 4-5). In this 
paper, I (re)construct the role of pleasure in the field of the education 
(I) and politics (II), and I argue that Plato’s remarks about pleasure in 
various dialogues should be treated as a whole.
2. Paideia
Possession of the above-mentioned knowledge means that the philoso-
pher-politician can prepare the individual for a particular profession or 
function through play  3 when the person is still a child and through pro-
found interest in the given subject. The task is accomplished by making 
the desires and pleasures aim at something through which the individual 
finds their fulfilment (telos)  4. Plato is fully aware of how essential to 
human life childhood is (and even the time before the birth of the child, 
when he or she is still in utero). He accepts the general rule that a right 
 1 Plat. Leg. 636d 5-7 (Saunders 1997); see also Plat. Leg. 631e; Phlb. 61c 5, 62d 
4-7; Arist. Eth. Nic. 1105a 10-12.
 2 These three criteria are also used by Plato in the sexual sphere of the citizen’s life 
to limit the precocious blow of the erotic among them; see Plat. Leg. 841a-b; Schöpsdau 
1994, 205.
 3 For a discussion of the role of play in education, see e.g. Stalley 1983, 130-132; 
on education in antiquity, see e.g. Marrou 1969 (basic education is discussed on pages 
116-120) and Jaeger 2001 (the education of the children based on the Laws is covered 
on pages 1186-1194).
 4 Plat. Leg. 643c 6-8; see also 793a 2-5; Resp. 441a-b. Plato speaks about the 
mixing of pleasure and pain, and that the right action should be based on the middle to 
which he alludes in the Philebus; see Krämer 1959, 191-194. It should be remembered 
that neither in the Republic nor in the Laws is there any praise of the individual; see 
Pappas 1993, 62. For a discussion of professional education, see e.g. Lodge 2000, 41-59.
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life (orthos bios) cannot rely solely on seeking bodily pleasures and com-
pletely avoiding all pain, but it should be based on preserving the measure 
(meson) in both of them so that a condition called cheerfulness (hileo-s) 
can appear in the end. And this is exactly what is proper for a pregnant 
woman and the child (Leg. 792c 9 - e 7). This cheerfulness is character-
ised as «divine» in the Laws, but it does not indicate – as is aptly noticed 
by Lisi  5 – that it is impossible to achieve the ideal but only the condition 
of cheerfulness is available to a human being. Pleasure combined with 
love (philia), pain and disgust (misos) are the first things experienced by 
a person after birth, and they become, so to speak, a point of departure 
for the individual’s arete¯. In the very period when the imperfect human 
being does not yet use the logos, a correct and right reaction to pleasure 
and pain in the form of harmony (sumpho-nia) is evident in the primordial 
model of so-phrosune¯ or arete¯  6. As it is well known, from Plato’s remarks 
concerning the anamnetic procedure (Phd. 72e-76a), the person’s nature 
is initially shaped on an intellectual level. It turns out, however, that 
predispositions also manifest themselves in the scope of morality. While 
the source of the first is a transcendent reality, the second is presum-
ably a consequence of the previous life (if we choose a more religious 
interpretation of Plato’s thought) or a natural outcome of the mortal part 
of the soul (if a more naturalistic interpretation is chosen). Both aspects 
need to be developed by appropriate education. The intellect needs to 
learn to recover its forgotten knowledge, and the moral teaching aims at 
bettering the person (if someone has earlier lived the best life or he or she 
has served a sentence for their moral crimes) and at improving their soul. 
If the lower aspects of the soul are not so dissonant as to make impossible 
not only their mutual harmonisation but also their euphony with reason, 
 5 Lisi 1985, 128, n. 8.
 6 Plat. Leg. 653a-b; 710a; see also Arist. Eth. Nic. 1104b 8-13: «For virtue of char-
acter is concerned with pleasures and pains. Indeed, it is because of pleasure that we do 
base actions and because of pain that we abstain from doing noble ones. That is why 
we must be brought up in a certain way straight from childhood, as Plato says, so as to 
enjoy and be pained by the things we should, since this is what the correct education 
is» (Reeve 2014); Arist. Pol. 1340a 15-18: «And since music happens to be one of the 
pleasures, and virtue is a matter of enjoying, loving, and hating in the right way, it is 
clear that nothing is more important than that one should learn to judge correctly and 
get into the habit of enjoying decent characters and noble actions» (Reeve 1998). One 
should also mention here Democritus’ view with reference to children’s predisposi-
tions. He thought that it was better to adopt a child than to beget it because adoption 
enables one to recognise the child’s natural abilities and to make a good choice. There is 
no such choice when parents give birth to the child because they have to count on and 
to settle for a child as it is born (Diels - Kranz 68 B 277 = fr. 724 Luria = D 141 Taylor = 
fr. 182.1 Leszl = D 394 Laks - Most).
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improvement and construction of the soul’s proper state seem to be still 
feasible. 
Childhood is essential, above all, because it is at that time that it is 
possible to form the habits on which unwritten customs depend. The 
customs – if they are right – become the basis for the written laws. 
According to Plato, the former is more important than the latter because 
their removal threatens a breakdown of the whole system  7. It is crucial to 
exploit the connection between play and pleasure in the earliest educa-
tion of children. This kinship, for example, makes learning mathematics 
easier and more efficient (it is not naturally about an advanced level of 
this science but only the basic one) as well as various other arts (Leg. 643c; 
819b-c). There are, however, certain human characters which further on 
in the educational process become smart and knavish (pone¯roi). It is nec-
essary to prevent them from accessing certain pleasures, especially the 
bodily ones, and to direct them to the truth so that they can become good 
citizens (Resp. 518d 9 - 519b 5).
2.1. Paideia: pleasure and music
The first stage of the educational process is linked above all with music, 
which pertains both to the body and the soul. The corporeal aspect mani-
fests itself most clearly in babyhood through its eager moving, cavorting 
about and issuing different sounds. But it is an expression of something 
far more profound:
Now, whereas all other creatures are devoid of any perception of the 
various kinds of order and disorder of movement […] to us men the very 
gods, who were given […] to be our fellows in the dance, have granted 
the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony (he¯ enrhuthmon te kai 
enarmonion aisthe¯sis meth’ he¯done¯s).  8
Pleasure, as can be seen, accompanies various mental states because 
animals are not endowed with this aisthe¯sis. This peculiar perception, 
for example, makes it possible for a child, who is rocked in the nanny’s 
arms and listens to her songs, to fall asleep  9. It is so because the human 
soul itself goes from non-order to order and is adjusted by being put 
into a regular movement on the one hand from one side, and it is also 
 7 Jaeger 2001, 1188.
 8 Plat. Leg. 653e 5 - 654a 3; Bury 1961.
 9 Plat. Leg. 790d. Plato notes also that the states connected with the Bacchic and 
Corybant rituals can be cured in this way; see Dodds 2002, 78-82.
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harmonised with the body and the soul on the other  10. Music can form 
character even if the intellect has not yet been developed. It has the 
ability to make someone sensitive to beauty, and as a source of joy, the 
beauty makes one focus on proper pleasure and pain (Resp. 401e-402a; 
Leg. 654c-d). It should be remembered, however, that it happens so at 
the primary level of education since advanced knowledge of music (both 
practical and theoretical) requires a fully developed reason and under-
standing of logos (Resp. 376e).
The significance of music in education is stressed not only in the 
Laws but also in the Republic  11. Pleasure accompanies music both on 
the bodily and on the spiritual level. The psychophysical aspect manifests 
itself in a dance that, again, enables one to commune with the beauty 
of movement (even if someone does not dance themselves but only 
watches it), though only when the movement expresses the arete¯ of body 
or soul  12. One should not then present in a dance figures that show 
immorality, for this would prevent such immoral figures becoming the 
images in the souls. If a human being is in the right situation similar to 
that of a dance, he or she does not then have a negative moral model 
of action. Music drives human beings to beauty, as mentioned already. 
Plato, however, believes that in playing and singing beauty should not be 
perceived (even if someone is not a professional musician) in melody but 
in rhythm and harmony (Leg. 655a). It is clear from Plato’s arguments 
in the Laws that he searches for an objective aesthetic criterion, which 
would make it possible to assess a music work appropriately, opposing at 
the same time the touchstone accepted by the many that can be pleasure 
alone  13. If pleasure is accepted as the only standard for evaluating music, 
 10 That is why – as Pelosi 2010, 22 rightly observes – the political control of the 
poets and musicians is so important. Moutsopoulos 2002a stresses the principle of musi-
cal motion, which makes it possible to explain, for example, the relationship between 
the body and soul.
 11 Schofield 2010.
 12 Plat. Leg. 655b; for more on the role of the dance in Plato, see Moutsopoulos 
2002b, 121-181. 
 13 Plat. Leg. 655c; cf. Diels - Kranz 68 B 194 (= 788 Luria = D 58 Taylor = 142.2 
Leszl); Diels - Kranz 82 B 11, 9-10; Diels - Kranz 82 B 23 (= D 35 Laks - Most): «Trag-
edy flourished and was acclaimed – it was a marvelous spectacle for the ears and eyes 
of the men who lived in those times, which produced by means of stories and sufferings 
‘a deception’, as Gorgias says, ‘in which the one who deceives is more just than the one 
who does not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent than the one who 
is not deceived’. For the one who deceives is more just because he has done what he has 
promised, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent, for whoever is not insensible 
is easily captured by the pleasure of words (he¯done¯ logo¯n)» (Laks - Most 2016). Cf. 
Diels - Kranz 90 (Dissoi logoi), 3, 45-46; Grg. 501d-502c.
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then there is neither objective beauty nor objective ugliness (e.g. every 
type of music is beautiful/pleasant but the forms of beauty are different, 
incommensurable and do not form the opposition beauty-ugliness); or 
beauty is simply subjective  14. In both cases, we are left with undesirable 
effects in education because there is no single and homogeneous system 
of values that can be instilled in young people. It also means that there is 
no such system within a polis (among citizens). Plato illustrates this with 
the hypothetical image of a pleasure contest, where the competitors are 
magicians, playwrights or rhapsodists. The results depend on the level 
of psychophysical development on the part of the judges. Magic would 
be most beautiful/pleasant to the children, comedy to older children, 
tragedy to young men and educated women and poetry to old men. Each 
group would hail the representative of their favourite profession as the 
winner, and there would be no consensus among them as to which would 
pose a threat to the unanimity of the polis (Leg. 658a-e).
Accepting pleasure as the only criterion for estimating music is a 
source of another danger. It leads to a constant search for new means 
of expression in music. Plato was fully aware that changes occur in the 
historical development of music. According to him, the first innovators 
were the poets who, under the influence of Bacchic madness, overpow-
ered by pleasure and without knowledge, as is in accordance with the 
law and custom of the Muses, have started to mix the various genres of 
music and to use instruments that are not respectable  15. One should bear 
in mind that the poets have an important position in the polis and that 
their authority legitimises randomness in the composing of music. But in 
that way, paranomia is also allowed – a conduct that manifests itself in 
the actions of the greatest criminals. In the socio-political context, the 
worst brigand is a tyrant whose soul Plato condemns to eternal suffering 
in Tartar (Phd. 113e). He also holds the poets responsible for convincing 
people that the most proper (orthotata) criterion for evaluating a musical 
work is pleasure. For the many are devoid of any deeper reflection on 
 14 Cf. Schöpsdau 1994, 270.
 15 For more on the development of musical instruments in Plato, see Moutsopou-
los 2002b, 104-119. In his Politics, Aristotle also discerns the connection between the 
development of instruments and pleasure (Pol. 1341a 31 - b 1): «Later, when they were 
better able to distinguish what does promote virtue from what does not, they rejected 
flute playing because of their experience with it. And the same thing happened to many 
other ancient instruments (for example, the pektis and the barbitos), those that enhance 
the pleasure (ta pros he¯done¯n sunteinonta) of people who listen for embellishments (the 
heptagon, the trigona, and the sambukai), and all those requiring professional knowl-
edge» (Reeve 1998).
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the nature of pleasure, since they think that pleasure is something purely 
subjective and their aesthetic judgement gains such character as well 
(Leg. 700d-e). Because the poets and people accept only this subjective 
measure, progress in music is not marked by an objective schema but it is 
subordinated to the disorderly pleasures (hupo tino-n atakto-n he¯dono-n)  16. 
The outcome is rather dramatic. As is well known, the aesthetic sphere 
of life is strictly connected with the ethical one, as illustrated by the ideal 
of kalokagathia. Consequently, the randomness  17 of aesthetic taste can be 
transferred to ethics. Freedom of judgement breeds belief in one’s own 
infallibility (i.e. «wisdom»), freedom from fear (adeia) and shamelessness 
(anaischuntia). A person ceases to be obedient to those who are better 
and deserve respect (i.e., the parents, the elders and the rulers above all). 
They start to break the written and the unwritten laws and they even 
pay no heed to possible repercussions through the gods’ punishment  18. 
Does this mean, however, that pleasure should be eliminated as a part of 
the aesthetic-moral evaluation of a work of art? Certainly not, because it 
accompanies reception of every such work or (to use Plato’s categories) 
it is present in the work (Resp. 403c). It is essential that this criterion is 
applied correctly.
The criterion of music should be pleasure (he¯done¯); not, however, the 
pleasure of any chance person; rather I should regard that music which 
pleases the best men and the highly educated as about the best, and as 
quite the best if it pleases (terpein) the one man who excels all others in 
virtue (arete¯) and education. And we say that the judges of these mat-
ters need virtue for the reason that they need to possess not only wisdom 
(phrone¯sis) in general, but especially courage.  19
 16 Plat. Leg. 660b. See Jaeger 2001, 1165. We may recall Popper’s 1993, 59 claim 
that a change is something evil and stillness is something divine. It seems, however, 
that this thesis is a little too extreme. A change can be positive, but only if it happens 
regularly, i.e., when it follows an objective pattern that can be grasped philosophically.
 17 Plato uses the word eleutheria, which is customarily translated as «freedom», 
but it seems to have both a positive and a negative connotation. The former occurs in 
case of the inner or political freedom (e.g. Phd. 114e; Resp. 329c; Leg. 693c), the latter 
concerns the vices truphe¯ and akolasia (Grg. 492c), the state of anarchia (Resp. 560e; 
Leg. 698b) and democracy (Resp. 562c).
 18 Leg. 701a-c. Lack of obedience in relation to one’s parents and rulers is typi-
cal of democracy in the Republic (562d-563d). See also Xenophon’s assessment of the 
Athenians (Mem. III 5, 15-16). It is worth stressing here that according to Socrates, one 
of the fundamental laws which constitute human knowledge is the principle of obedi-
ence to someone better – see Plat. Ap. 28d.
 19 Plat. Leg. 658e 7 - 659a 4; Bury 1961. The word phrone¯sis can be understood 
here both in a philosophical and a more popular sense; see Hentschke 1971, 216, 
222  ff.; Schäffer 1981, 173, 360. Courage in this passage of the Laws seems to mean 
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This quotation shows that a person who is fully developed intellectually 
can make a correct assessment of musical work and is morally upright, 
i.e., they have to complete the whole paideia. It is assumed that such a 
person is adequately endowed with physiological properties. They cannot 
be tone-deaf, but they have to be characterised by a vigorous capacity of 
sensation (euaisthe¯sia). It is an exceptional sensitivity, which allows one 
not only to recognise and estimate the composition of a work and the 
correspondence between the means of expression and the musical kind 
but also the right quality of influence on the human soul  20. It should also 
be remembered that this keenness of senses is a gift from the gods, but it 
is only a potency, which must be developed in the process of theoretical 
and practical education to be a full and long-lasting disposition (in Aris-
totle’s terminology).
What is interesting is that Plato describes the musician in a similar 
manner. Naturally, the artist has to be able to play an instrument, but he 
also must have musical knowledge. They have to know not only how to 
compose musical work but also how the particular type of work of art 
impacts on the audience’s souls (especially the young ones). Having such 
knowledge enables them to provide the public with harmless pleasures 
(asineis he¯donai) and joy  21. Is there any difference between the expert 
who assesses the work of art and a professional musician? According to 
Plato, the former also has a gymnastic education, and can relate both 
aspects (musical and gymnastic) to the soul in the most appropriate way 
(metrio-tata) (Resp. 412a). The latter can be dominated by pleasure from 
a particular musical type and his individual attitude to compose and to 
play this form of music. That is why it cannot rely on his or her epistemic 
the ability to confront the crowd, on the one hand, and the ability to keep one’s own 
beliefs, on the other (see also Resp. 429c-d). The connection between phrone¯sis and 
andreia can be viewed similarly to that found in the Phaedo (69a-b). The former is the 
basis for the latter, as it establishes the reality and truth of courage.
 20 Plat. Leg. 670b; 812b. In the Republic (527d 2-4) competent sensitiveness is 
useful also for agriculture, navigation and the army. On the relation between the physi-
ological and intellectual reception of music, see Barker 2000, 85-99 and Pelosi 2010, 
89-113.
 21 Plat. Leg. 670d; cf. Resp. 357b: «Tell me, do you think there is a kind of good 
we welcome, not because we desire what comes from it, but because we welcome it 
for its own sake – joy, for example, and all the harmless pleasures that have no results 
beyond the joy of having them?» (Grube - Reeve 1997). A different perspective on 
sensual pleasure can be found in the Greater Hippias where Socrates acknowledges the 
pleasures of hearing and seeing as the least harmful (asinestatai) and Hippias as the best 
(Hp. Mai. 303e). The difference can be put down to the doubtful authenticity of the 
Greater Hippias.
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perspective and aesthetic judgement  22. Such narrowing of the epistemo-
logical horizon can also be connected with the problem of how music 
impacts the human soul – he or she sees that music has such influence, 
but they do not know why and they cannot be aware of music’s role in 
the life of society as a whole  23.
What are, however, the afore-mentioned harmless pleasures? The 
answer to this question is connected not only with music and its recep-
tion but also with the status of an object (and the art’s object in particu-
lar) and the pleasure involved in perceiving it. In the Laws (667b-668a), 
it is accepted that the object-sphere contains the things that are somehow 
attractive (they possess a charis which sometimes seems to be the same 
as pleasure in fact). The being of those things depends only on their 
attractiveness but there are two other features to be taken into considera-
tion: correctness (orthote¯s) and benefit (o-pheleia). These can belong both 
to the sensual (e.g. the food or the works of the imitative arts [technai 
eikastikai]) and the spiritual sphere (e.g. science [mathe¯sis]). In the last 
case, the object’s whole positive value consists of the correctness, the 
benefit, the excellence (to eu) and the beauty that are based on the high-
est values, i.e., the truth. On the other hand, the positive value of the art’s 
work can be restricted to pleasure only or it can be expanded to include 
another feature called accuracy (isote¯s), i.e. the adequate, proportional, 
qualitative and quantitative (hoson kai poion) copying of the object in 
the work of art (Leg. 668b 6-7). Isote¯s seems to belittle using pleasure 
as the criterion, but it does not mean that the latter is useless. Pleasure 
that is founded on a (non-individualistic, of course) positive aesthetic 
judgement can be made on the object which is not joined with the truth, 
benefit or similarity and its pleasant reception brings no harm, i.e. the 
reception lies only in a pure play  24.
A simple play rules out the intellectual reception of an artistic work 
(especially music), and lack of intellect is typical of a child. That is why 
a correct introduction of a child to the world of sounds is so essential. 
 22 Plat. Leg. 802c. In the Republic (462b-d), the demand is made that all citizens 
together should derive pleasure from the same object, since otherwise the polis is in 
danger of disintegration due to the individualisation (idio¯sis) of pleasure.
 23 An example of this can be seen in the demand that music and the accompanying 
words should be in harmony with the festivals so as to bring to the polis the benefit and 
produce fortunate pleasure (eutuche¯s he¯done¯) (Leg. 813a).
 24 See Plat. Plt. 288c 1-9: «Would we want to put down as a fifth class things to do 
with decoration, painting, and those representations that are completed by the use of 
painting, and of music, which have been executed solely to give us pleasures, and which 
would appropriately be embraced by a single name? […] for not one of them is for the 
sake of a serious purpose, but all are done for amusement» (Rowe 1997).
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It is worth stressing that from the very beginning, music enables one to 
develop an order (taksis) called so-phrosune¯ and the effect is an improve-
ment of human nature (Leg. 802c-d). Music, apart from sounds and 
words, also influences a Greek man through dance, which is likewise 
a type of imitative art that is closely connected with education and 
pleasure. Dance is a form of movement of the body that is related to 
the internal motions of the soul  25. Movement, as already mentioned, is 
something very significant for a child still in utero and it is has a relaxing 
effect on a baby. A lack of active intellect is the reason why the child 
whose body and soul are not mutually balanced is highly susceptible to 
various external stimuli, which impact on the unreasonable part of the 
soul. Singing and telling proper myths (by mother or nanny) as well as 
various physical exercises are the first therapeutic actions, which moder-
ate the unbalanced structure of a man (Resp. 377a-b). The words stimu-
late the development of the reason, while putting the body in a regular 
movement produces a fundamental sense of order. On the sensible level, 
human nature as a whole, which is influenced to such a great extent by 
external factors in the early stages of development, is slowly shaped by 
both processes. When the conscious and wise person acquires his paid-
eia, pleasure can be involved in the educational procedures – as in case 
of teaching mathematics (Resp. 536d-537a; Leg. 819b) – or it can also 
be necessary to cut off the sensible pleasures, if they hamper intellectual 
development in any way (Resp. 519a-b).
Education is achieved through hearing and seeing. It should, how-
ever, be remembered that one should first of all listen to the words which 
accompany music. It is well known that Plato demanded control over 
the content of artistic works because they have an essential influence on 
the formation of individuals’ character. Hearing about customs (espe-
cially the ones that are better than the individual or community culti-
vates) provides a proper standard of behaviour and pleasure at the same 
time  26. The value of the performance and pleasure does not arise from 
the technical or artistic, i.e. purely aesthetic, quality, but are founded on 
the benefit which the soul gains when someone experiences the show. 
 25 Cf. Moutsopoulos 2002b, 124-137.
 26 Plat. Leg. 659c 3-4; Plato expresses thus in the imperative form: «they ought 
to come to experience more elevated pleasures from listening to the portrayal of char-
acters invariably better than their own» (Saunders 1997). This argument can probably 
be taken as directed against comedy, if Aristotle’s assessment is accepted (Pol. 1448a 
15-18): «This very distinction separates tragedy from comedy: the latter tends to rep-
resent people inferior, the former superior, to existing humans» (Halliwell 1995). On 
music cf. Plat. Leg. 798d 8-9. 
Erga -Logoi – 7 (2019) 1
https://www.ledonline.it/Erga-Logoi - Online ISSN 2282-3212 - Print ISSN 2280-9678 
The Political and Paideutic Function of Pleasure in Plato’s Philosophy
113
The positive effect on education can also be achieved by watching or 
performing a dance, which together with music and words is the third 
component of the dramatic play.
While Plato divides dance into two forms, spoudaion and phaulon, 
each of these includes two sub-types. The first contains the combative or 
fire (purriche¯) dance and the peaceful or harmonious (emmeleia  27) dance. 
The peaceful dance is connected with pleasure because its movements 
reflect the soul of a man in favourable circumstances (en eupragiais) 
whose cause is good (Resp. 379b) and the soul of the level-headed person 
experiencing well-measured (emmetroi) pleasures (Leg. 814e). Such a 
person can be called well-ordered (eunomos), and if the analogy between 
the soul and the state is taken into consideration, his or her soul is highly 
regular, i.e. it is adequately educated, pious, rational and he or she knows 
their place in the social structure and their assignments, i.e. he or she is 
happy  28. When someone like that dances, they express in their movement 
worship of the gods, their progeny and propitiousness (eu prattein) (Leg. 
815d). Dividing dance into two forms, Plato points out two possible ways 
to achieve this auspicious state. The first consists in overcoming difficul-
ties and dangers in order to achieve greater pleasures. To be a greater 
pleasure means being more dynamic and intense. It is also increases the 
dynamic of the soul that is reflected in a more vigorous dance and has 
a more energetic influence on the spectator’s soul. The second type of 
the peace-dance is connected with the sense of security when a man can 
retain and accumulate the goods he or she has. The pleasures are more 
softened (praioterai) in this case, and the internal and external move-
ments are more well ordered, more practised and more placid (and they 
affect the observer similarly). It should not be forgotten that emmeleia is 
the dance of tragedy, so a good dance represents perfectly the inner state 
of the right person and there is an appropriate mimetic relation between 
movements and words (Leg. 815e-816b). It is well known that it is the 
only activity based on mimesis which is right for the guards to practise 
(Resp. 395a-396d). Such performance has not only an ethical and a politi-
cal but also an aesthetic dimension because it mirrors the physical and 
ethereal beauty of the person who is closest to the divine. 
 27 For more on this, see Moutsopoulos 2002b, 170; Schöpsdau 2003, 593-594.
 28 Plat. Cri. 53c; Resp. 380b, 406c, 605b; Leg. 927b; Ti. 24d. The meaning and sig-
nificance of the analogy between the soul and the state has been extensively discussed; 
see e.g. Anderson 1971; Williams 1973; Ferrari 2003 (especially ch. 3).
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2.2. Paideia: sexuality
While pleasures come from desires, three desires seem most pleasurable 
to every young man: the desire for food, the desire for drink and the 
desire for sex  29. There is a great need to use numerous means to change 
this attitude, these being fear and orthoi logoi on the social level, and 
music as well as physical exercises on the educational level (Leg. 782e). 
The educational measures should be concurrently implemented because 
the nature of a person who specialises only in music would otherwise be 
too soft (Resp. 387c), whereas a person who solely practises sport would 
be too violent (Resp. 410d). Physical activity plays a very important part 
as a regulating measure of sexual tension (it is able to relieve it), which 
has the greatest inclination to hubris (Leg. 841a). Yet Plato is aware 
that the question of sexual behaviour needs a broader view and further 
limitations. For instance, space where the young exercise – the gymna-
sion – can be a place where their sexuality is warped and their sexual 
orientation is changed from a heterosexual one to attraction to the same 
gender  30. According to Plato, two forms of sexual intercourse and the 
resulting pleasures should be forbidden as being against nature: homo-
sexual and incestuous  31. The lawgiver has the task of taking care of the 
relations between the sexes. Moreover, one has to take into consideration 
the essence of philia, i.e., the desires and all issues connected with eros 
(ta legomena ero-ta)  32. In its proper form, philia is a relation between the 
 29 Plato says in the Phaedo that a philosopher should not concern himself with 
these things because a soul is in danger of being tarnished (Phd. 64d; 81d). It is so, I 
believe, only when someone confines their life solely to these pleasures or when they 
put these on the top of the hierarchy of values. In the Protagoras (353c), these three 
types of pleasures are linked with a view of pleasure which ordinary people share. Plato 
mentions drinking, food and sex as the pleasures of the young ones in the Republic 
(329a). Their importance should be diminished along with age in favour of the desires 
and pleasures of logos (Resp. 328d). These three aspects of life are the lowest part of the 
soul domain (Resp. 580e). While Plato also warns that they foster hubris, the same state-
ment can be found in Democritus (Diels - Kranz 68 B 235 = 750 Luria = D 99 Taylor = 
141.2 Leszl = D 248 Laks - Most). See also Plat. Phdr. 238a-c and Fisher’s 1992, 467-470 
commentary. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1118a-b; Pr. 880a 6-10.
 30 Plat. Leg. 636b; cf. Chrm. 154a-c; 155d; Symp. 217b-c. This does not mean that 
one should steer clear of the gymnasion and common meals so as to restrict one’s activ-
ity exclusively to one’s home. Isolation and seclusion make pleasures, pains and desires 
transform into habits which lead to paranomia and neglect of the spiritual development 
(Leg. 727c; 788b).
 31 Plat. Leg. 838a-e; cf. Phdr. 250e. See Dover 2004, 202-203; Schöpsdau 2011, 
199-200.
 32 Plat. Leg. 836e; cf. Phdr. 237d-238a. Hyland 1968, 32-46 thinks that ero¯s, epi-
thumia and philia can be arranged in a hierarchy and the criterion for the arrangement 
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equal or similar elements with regard to virtue (arete¯) and it is marked 
by gentleness and permanence – the community is forever. In this rela-
tionship, the body should only be an object of observation and admi-
ration (time¯) because sexual satisfaction is a sign of hubris (that is why 
this kinship is called ‘being pure’ [hagneuein]). The real association is 
formed by the souls and virtues (so-phrosune¯, fortitude, magnanimity and 
prudence) – things which are highly respected and held in almost divine 
veneration  33. Another form of philia is the relation between the elements 
which are the generic opposites. It is dangerous and savage, and the aim 
of this desire is a bodily fulfilment accompanied by a disregard for the 
soul. Plato uses a metaphor of the fruit’s consumption, which shows 
that it is a relationship between something active and passive, older and 
younger. This relationship is purely egoistic. These are the features of 
the classic homosexual relationship  34. The alliance between the elements 
is dynamic and only when it gains proper strength does it become suit-
ably fierce (sphodron) – this state is called ero-s. Only the former of the 
two forms of the relationship should be encouraged in a polis and if its 
participants are both males, then it is the only acceptable kind of (homo)
erotics  35. 
The most important thing in the entire education (paideia) is to chan-
nel the desires and activities to ero-s so as to make someone not only a 
good worker but also a perfect citizen  36. The proper and improper ero-s 
can also display itself in the heterosexual bond. A sexual act should 
serve to produce progeny (paidogonia) first of all and it ought to occur 
between the persons acknowledged as compatible and at the befitting 
time and circumstances. There is another dimension as well that allows 
the relief of sexual madness (lussa, mania) and prevent hubris in the 
is the degree of rationality which they exhibit. He does not take into consideration this 
fragment of the Laws. A convincing polemic with Hyland’s standpoint is presented by 
Cummings 1981, 10-18. The concept of epithumia in Plato’s middle dialogues is ana-
lysed by Kahn 1987, 77-103.
 33 Naturally, it needs to be remembered how vital is to discern the beauty in this 
case and to intellectualise this experience; see Plat. Phdr. 250b-c; Symp. 210a-212a; Tim. 
45a-b; Leg. 837c; 961d.
 34 There is a third form of philia which has a mixed character. According to Plato, 
it is hard to ascertain what such a person desires. They crave the body, on the one hand, 
but there is something that stops them, which this leads to the state of aporia.
 35 Plat. Leg. 836e-837d. There is also a right (orthos) ero¯s in the Republic. It is 
a long way from madness (mania), intemperance (akolasia) and sexual intercourse 
(aphrodusia), as it is bound up with decency (kosmion), beauty of reason and cultured 
(mousiko¯s) love; cf. Phdr. 255a-256d.
 36 Plat. Leg. 643c; 644e: a perfect citizen knows how to rule and be ruled accord-
ing to the dictates of justice.
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scope of bodily pleasures  37. When a husband and wife with the right ero-s 
are connected, this relationship is called a «proper friendship»  38. Plato 
says in the Republic that the right ero-s should not include pleasure, which 
means that this pleasure is connected with intemperance, madness and 
bodily pleasure in homosexual intercourse. But it seems that it can relate 
to marriage as well. If the relationship between a married couple is solely 
grounded on he¯done¯, it will not be actualised in a friendly community  39. 
3. Politics
All the above-mentioned regulations aim to specify the rule of proper life 
in a polis. There is also a canon in the case of individuals worthy of being 
guards (phulakes). Having presented the activities of the lowest class (the 
producers), Plato indicates in the Republic that if a polis happens to be 
at war there must exist a special social group whose primary task would 
be the defence of the state. They have to meet the unique criteria with 
respect to body and soul. The candidates for the position of guard should 
have good eyesight and be quick and strong, for example. They ought to 
have fully formed the aspect of the soul called a thumoeides in order to 
be infallibly described as brave people  40. Those who possess the virtue 
called courage (andreia) are able to resist not only external but also inter-
nal threats. The inner risks could be both the people who break the laws, 
 37 Plat. Leg. 838e-839b; 840d-e. Plato says also (Leg. 888a) that a tremendous 
appetite for pleasure (laimargia te¯s he¯done¯s) is the cause of madness, and we know also 
from the Republic (619b 7 - c 2) that a tyrant possesses such lust. It is worth remember-
ing that according to the Symposium (208d-e) to produce progeny is a human expres-
sion (though a lower one) of the desire for immortality. There are naturally various 
differences between the ancient and contemporary views on marriage. The contrast is 
described by Morrow 1960, 439 as follows: «For Plato, as for the Greeks generally, 
marriage was not the satisfaction of personal inclination, but the performance of a duty; 
and in choice of a mate a man should not be guided by romantic considerations – this 
the Greeks would have considered selfish and irresponsible – but by the interests of his 
family and the state». Dover 1974, 211 presents a more optimistic outlook on marriage.
 38 Plat. Leg. 839b 1. On friendship between husband and wife, see also Xenophon 
(Hier. 4, 3-4). Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1162a 16-27) notes that philia is naturally present in a 
marriage and that it is based on pleasure or benefit but can be accomplished by virtue 
(arete¯) as well.
 39 Plat. Resp. 403a; cf. Ludwig 2007, 208.
 40 Naturally, it should be remembered that according to Plato, the soul is not the 
place for the mental or emotional states, as the soul itself thinks, desires and feels; see 
Lorenz 2006, 146; Ferrari 2007, 165-207.
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but the danger can also be found in the soul itself. Courageous persons 
are capable of overcoming fear, enduring pain, restricting their desires, 
resisting various temptations and keeping the balance between pleasures, 
thus, living a happy life in the end (Leg. 633d-e, 840c). They have to deal 
differently with their fellow citizens and with their enemies. They should 
be gentle and magnanimous (praion kai megalothumon) in the first case 
and dangerous or ruthless (chalepos) and courageous (thumoeides) in the 
second (Resp. 375a 11 - c 8). To have such character, a human being 
needs to be well educated and this education, as already mentioned, is 
accomplished by music and athletic exercises. Their primary aim is to har-
monise two aspects of human nature – to thumoeides and to philosophon 
(«a love of the wisdom»), and when this is perfectly (teleo-s) achieved, it 
is possible to find someone who is most musical and most harmonious 
(mousikotaton kai euarmostotaton), i.e., highly educated and remarkably 
well-tempered (Resp. 411e 4 - 412a 7). Their secondary goal is to shape 
the right relationship between an excellent soul and a well-developed 
body  41. In realisation of the first purpose, the most important thing is to 
instill the right beliefs by which human beings are to be governed.
3.1. Politics: pleasure and beliefs
It is well known that human beings can have true or right beliefs (aletheis 
[orthai] doksai). They are, generally speaking, a subset of the set called 
«beliefs» (Cra. 387b). Belief is something between knowledge and 
ignorance  42, and it can be extracted from the soul through dialogic and 
dialectic examination. When beliefs achieve a higher level of accuracy, 
they become knowledge (Men. 85c-d). It is the basis for an action which 
is proper, i.e., useful for the individual and society, and demonstrates 
competent thinking which is able to justify the action  43. True beliefs do 
not seem to be an absolutely durable element of human thought because 
there are three things which can contribute to their rejection: (1) decep-
tion (kleptein), (2) delusion (goeteuein  44) or (3) violence (biazein). The 
 41 Plat. Resp. 376e, 521d-e; Leg. 795d-796d. For more on military training, see 
Jaeger 2001, 827-834.
 42 Plat. Symp. 202a. Plato says in the Laws (632c) that some of the guardians are 
on duty pursuant to phrone¯sis and some of them according to ale¯the¯s doksa. The mutual 
connection of prudence and true beliefs is not possible until relatively old age (Leg. 
653a).
 43 Klein 1965, 243-245.
 44 This word is connected with magic, but Plato uses it metaphorically, since – as 
Dickie 2003, 44 explains – there is no theoretical reflection on magic in Plato’s dialogues.
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causes of refusal in the case of (1) are persuasion (peitho-) and logos. Since 
they have a more prolonged effect on someone, they erase and cause the 
person to forget the right beliefs. Pain and suffering (odune¯ kai alge¯do-n) 
change the belief (metadoksadzein) in the case of (3). For this research, 
the most important is the factor which triggers (2). Delusion or bewitch-
ment (ke¯lein) can be caused by pleasure or fear (Resp. 413b 1 - c 3). Let 
us briefly see how.
It seems that pleasure brings about a certain ‘shutdown’ of the 
rational. In the Phaedrus, for example, it is said that a human being 
can easily become indolent in this region (Athens), especially at noon, 
in the bosom of nature and hearing the sounds of the cicadas. The best 
use of this time can be made when it is devoted to philosophical discus-
sion (Phdr. 259a). Admittedly, the pleasure of hearing is itself a pure one 
according to Plato (Phlb. 51b-d), but it would not be a harmless pleasure 
in this case. It is probably so because someone hears only music without 
the intellectual content in the form of words (logos)  45. Even if music 
accompanies the words, as in the poetic or dramatic work, there is still 
the danger that the work of art is created through a formally and mate-
rially (morally) improper mimesis so that its reception is dominated by 
pleasure. Plato, however, seems to allow for the possibility that if there is 
a rational basis for the proper connection between words and music (and 
probably dance as well – Leg. 814e-816e), then they can be produced 
and played within a polis  46, because when an appropriate aesthetic form 
of the work is received by the body-soul structure in which the rational 
and irrational are correctly harmonised, it is able to sustain or even to 
improve the form of the human being (Leg. 840b-c).
Well-arranged and well-expressed disquisition can also produce 
delusions and an enslavement of the soul. Socrates clarifies that the lis-
teners of the sophist Protagoras are in this state (Prt. 315b) and that he 
 45 It is necessary to bear in mind that composing purely instrumental pieces is 
criticised by Plato in the Laws because such music is devoid of its mimetic function and 
it cannot perform any moral role in society (Leg. 669d-670a) – Moutsopoulos 2002b, 
272. That some types of music are harmful to the soul is stated clearly in the Republic 
(411b-c). In the above-mentioned section of the Laws, making poetry without music is 
also met with disapproval; cf. Plat. Phdr. 278c.
 46 Plat. Resp. 607c 4-6: «Nonetheless, if the poetry that aims at pleasure and imita-
tion has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-
governed city, we at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm 
it exercises» (Grube - Reeve 1997). In the Greek original, the optative is used twice, 
which suggests that the author of the utterance does not want to or cannot settle the 
relationship between reality and the condition expressed in the utterance; see Kühner - 
Gerth 1904, 477 f.; Auerbach - Golias 1985, 209.
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also falls into it after having heard the famous myth about the origins of 
humankind and the ensuing explanation. What is more, he had recovered 
from this with difficulty, because his desire for hearing was so intensely 
stimulated  47. Plato stresses again the secure connection between human’s 
emotionality and words, as the sophist Gorgias has already done in his 
Defence of Helen:
For incantations divinely inspired by means of speeches (logoi) are bring-
ers of pleasure and removers of pain. For the power of an incantation, 
when it is conjoined with the opinion of the soul, beguiles it. persuades 
it, and transforms it by sorcery. For two arts have been discovered, those 
of sorcery and of magic, which are errors (hamartemata) of the soul and 
deceptions (apatemata) of opinion. […] The power of speech (logos) has 
the same relation (logos) with the arrangement (taxis) of the soul as the 
arrangement (taxis) of drugs has with the nature of bodies. For just as 
some drugs draw some fluids out of the body, and others other ones, and 
some stop an illness and others stop life, in the same way some speeches 
(logoi) cause pain, others pleasure, others fear, others dispose listeners to 
courage, others drug and bewitch the soul by some evil persuasion.  48
Thus, Gorgias finds emotional influence to be the primary goal of rheto-
ric. Plato shows by contrast that the bewitchment (as predominant effect) 
must mislead (apate¯) (Resp. 413c) if it is not accompanied by intellectual 
discipline, and it is so because a rhetor-sophist «calls up phantoms and 
makes people believe in things that do not exist»  49. It should be remem-
 47 Plat. Prt. 328d; cf. Menex. 235a-c; Euthyd. 289e-290a. Manuwald 1999, 236 
reads this passage of the Protagoras ironically.
 48 Diels - Kranz 82 B 11, 59-64, 87-93 (= D 24 Laks - Most). Plato also emphasises 
the strength of Gorgias’ rhetoric in the Symposium (198b-c). The sophist Thrasymachus 
was regarded as a master of emotional rhetoric – Plat. Phdr. 267c-d (= Diels - Kranz 85 
B 6 = D 13a Laks - Most): «The might of the Chalcedonian seems to me to have pre-
vailed by his art of plaintive speeches drawn to the subjects of old age and poverty. At 
the same time, this man has become expert at ‘making the crowd angry’, and conversely 
‘beguiling them with incantations when they have become angry’, as he says; and he is 
the best at slandering and at quashing slanders in one way or another» (Laks - Most 
2016). Herm. in Phdr. 239, 18-20 (= Diels - Kranz 85 B 6 = D 13b Laks - Most): «The 
Chalcedonian, i.e. Thrasymachus, taught how one must arouse the judge’s compassion 
and secure his pity: age, poverty, plaintive children, and things like that […]» (Laks - 
Most 2016). 
 49 Romilly 1975, 27. See also Plat. Resp. 598c 7 - d 5: «Hence, whenever someone 
tells us that he has met a person who knows all the crafts as well as all the other things 
that anyone else knows and that his knowledge of any subject is more exact than any of 
theirs is, we must assume that we’re talking to a simple-minded fellow who has appar-
ently encountered some sort of magician or imitator and been deceived into thinking 
him omniscient and that the reason he has been deceived is that he himself can’t dis-
tinguish between knowledge, ignorance, and imitation» (Grube - Reeve 1997). Cf. Plat. 
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bered, however, that apart from the negative aspect, this enchantment 
could probably have a positive one too, and this is in Eros’ power: the 
god who was «a genius with enchantments, potions and clever pleadings 
(deinos goe¯s kai pharmakeus kai sophiste¯s)» (Symp. 203d 8); and accord-
ing to Alcibiades at least, it is due to Socrates (Symp. 215b-216a). The 
reader is thereby enthralled both by the sophists and by the main char-
acter of Plato’s works so that examination of the dialogues becomes an 
educational task. It is possible to combat sophistic apparitions by means 
of the logical and rhetorical tools of Socrates, on the one hand, but one 
should not forget that Socrates could also bewitch everyone. One should 
spare no effort to stand up to his illusions, even if they can be useful or 
noble lies  50.
Change of beliefs is in itself not bad, but it cannot be constant, and 
it should take place solely in the specific age. If it is only possible, the 
switch ought to proceed entirely intentionally and its culmination must 
be the true beliefs. Example of this process can be found in the Sophist 
(265d-e), where the young Theaetetus talks to the Visitor. The former 
is entirely aware of the fact that his beliefs are changed, and the latter 
that has diagnosed the nature of the young man sees that Theaetetus will 
probably modify his views in the future, but the change will aim in the 
proper direction. At the same time, the Visitor tries to stabilise the per-
mutation temporarily at least by framing a position which would satisfy 
them both  51. Unquestionably, however, the best guard (aristos phulaks) 
cannot change his beliefs, because the thinking and acting of members of 
the ruling elite should always aim at what is best (beltiston) for the polis. 
And that is precisely why one ought to put the candidate for the guard to 
the «test of spell» (goe¯teias hamilla), consisting in changing his environ-
ment from a pleasant to a dreadful one and vice versa. If he or she is well 
educated, they will behave appropriately in accord with the established 
rules in every situation  52. What more can we say about such a trial?
Soph. 234c, 235a-c, 241b; Plt. 291c. It should be remembered that the ability to beguile 
by words is also attributed to Socrates. He mentions it himself in the Apology (17a 6 - 
b 1: me¯ hup’ emou eksapate¯the¯ ho¯s deinou ontos legein), and Glaukon (Resp. 358b) as 
well as Meno (Men. 80a) accuse him of it.
 50 On noble lies, see e.g. Page 1991; Calabi 1998; Ghibellini 2004; Schofield 2007.
 51 If this interpretation is correct, it could undermine again Popper’s famous 
thesis that for Plato change is evil, whilst stability is divine.
 52 Plat. Resp. 413bc 5 - 414a 7; see also Resp. 502e-503a: «We said, if you remem-
ber, that they must show themselves to be lovers of their city when tested by pleasure 
and pain and that they must hold on to their resolve through labors, fears, and all other 
adversities» (Grube - Reeve 1997); Resp. 503e-504a: «Therefore they must be tested in 
the labors, fears, and pleasures we mentioned previously. But they must also be exercised 
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Wine, as is well known, has played such a significant role in Hel-
lenic culture that its way of drinking has served to distinguish Greeks 
from barbarians. The former, if only they considered themselves well 
educated, drank wine proportionally mixed with water because they 
thought consuming undiluted wine could cause madness and crime. 
There is a famous example of this in Homer: during Peirithous’ wedding, 
the Centaur Eurytion went berserk after he had become inebriated on 
undiluted wine and perpetrated terrible deeds. Heracles, Theseus and 
Nestor got him under control (causing him to lose his nose and ears), 
and the result of this was a war between the Centaurs and Lapiths  53. 
Plato stresses that pleasures, sufferings, inclinations (thumoi) and loves 
(erotes) can be intensified by drinking wine and excessive drinking can 
deprive a human being of the senses, memories, beliefs and conscious-
ness (phroneseis)  54. That is why one should not generally consume wine 
before one turns 18 years old. It is reasonable to drink wine moderately 
until one is 30 years old, and after 40 one can consume wine in a more 
‘loose’ manner (Leg. 666a-b). A total ban on drinking wine by young 
people can be scientifically (physically) justified. Youth is the period 
when fire dominates in human nature  55, and as Plato says in the Timaeus 
(60a), wine is one of those liquids which contain fire and, therefore, its 
basic function is to warm the soul along with the body. Hence, drinking 
wine in youth brings a reinforcement of fire in human nature and, thus, 
not only a physical but also a psychic disturbance. Consumption of wine 
in many other subjects – which we didn’t mention but are adding now – to see whether 
they can tolerate the most important subjects or will shrink from them like the cowards 
who shrink from other tests» (Grube - Reeve 1997).
 53 Hom. Od. XXI 295-304. It is worth noting that there appear the verbal forms 
of aao¯ (aadzo¯) and the noun ate¯ in this passage. According to Frenández-Galiano, it 
«emphasizes the destructive moral blindness caused by ate¯»; Russo - Frenández-Ga lia-
 no - Heubeck 1992, 180. Antinous addresses reproachfully Odysseus two verses earlier 
and he expresses a measure-maxim that is very characteristic of Greek culture: «Sweet 
wine hurts thee, which harms others also, whoever take it too abundantly, nor drinks 
properly» (Buckley 1851).
 54 Plat. Leg. 645d 4 - e 3. Similar opinions can also be found in early Greek 
poetry – Schöpsdau 1994, 249-250.
 55 Cf. Hippoc. Nat. Hom. 12: «For you must know that a man is a warmest on 
the first day of his existence and coldest on the last. For it must be that the body is hot 
which grows and progresses with force; but when the body begins to decay with an easy 
decline it grows cooler. It is on account of this that a man, growing most on his first 
day, is proportionally hotter then; on his last day, decaying most, he is proportionally 
cooler» (Jones 1959); Aph. 1, 14: «Growing creatures have most innate hot, and it is for 
this reason that they need most food […]» (Jones 1959).
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can, however, be a chance to confront shame (aischune¯, aidos  56), which 
should appear when someone, yielding the many and different pleasures, 
does something nasty  57. Because a young mind is not fully developed, 
an essential aetiological factor becomes the possibility to imagine and to 
realise that the authorities can condemn an evil deed and its perpetrator. 
Thus, it bears testimony both to the self-awareness (someone’s imperfec-
tion) and to the ability to accept the authority of the sages. To undergo 
the wine test makes it possible to see how man copes with pleasures, i.e. 
to test their character and to call them moderate (sophro-n) after they had 
prevailed  58. This and other tasks (erga)  59 given to the candidates by the 
guards cause them to gain experience, which is a necessary factor for over-
coming oneself. The wine test is a preparation for symposia in which the 
individual will participate in the future and during which «the political, 
moral, public and personal values» will be tested  60. The other factors are 
logos, and skill (techne¯), which allow either to leave the symposium when 
someone feels insecure and is afraid to succumb to alcohol or to keep 
temperance as an assembly is finished  61. Plato, as already mentioned, 
notes that wine can intensify emotions and he also describes the process: 
it appears as cheerfulness at first, but along with drinking it turns into 
a growing optimism and a deep conviction of intellectual capabilities 
(doksa). The next step is to believe that one is a wise man and is able to 
speak and to present them freely. The last phase is to be intrepid and 
to converse and act on the spur of the moment (aokno-s) (Leg. 649a-b). 
 56 The open question is whether the example of an alcohol drinking allows think-
ing that there is an instinctive disposition to self-control in human nature; cf. Cairns 
1993, 375.
 57 When shame does not appear, the character is morally defective, i.e. there is a 
vice in it called impertinence (tharros) or shamelessness (anaideia), which is the greatest 
evil both for the individual and the society (Leg. 647a 10 - b 1). This vice can also 
manifest itself on the epistemological level – Tht. 196d-e; Phdr. 243c; Resp. 560e-561a. 
More see Schöpsdau 1994, 242-245.
 58 Even if someone does not belong to the two higher classes of Plato’s state, 
so¯phrosune¯ is a desirable virtue, because a restrained worker is obedient to the rulers 
and they can dominate the excessive pleasures of drinking, eating and sex (Resp. 389e-
390a).
 59 Some tasks need to distract the young person’s attention from the accom-
panying pleasures. An example is hunting, whose aim is to get to know homeland, and 
not to spend time pleasantly (Leg. 763b; 823c).
 60 Bowie 1997, 1-2.
 61 Plat. Leg. 646e-648e. This passage of the Laws speaks about an imaginary 
beverage – a gift from the gods which makes it possible to put the character to the 
test. Although the argument seems to have a broader meaning, it is constructed on the 
analogy of wine and it is possible to relate it to the particular event of the symposium.
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The effect of alcohol abuse is not virtue, i.e. the fearless (the bravery) 
in a battle (in such a contest [ago-n] as in the Symposium, for example), 
but vice. That is why it is so important to drink in moderation and in a 
controlled way or, as in the case of the guardians in active service, to steer 
clear of alcohol completely  62.
The candidates for the guards (and the guards themselves) are con-
stantly under surveillance to be selected from among the most unique 
individuals. They have to be the best, i.e. entirely rational, sagacious 
(phronimoi) and capable of taking care of the polis because the state is 
the first and most important object of their philia and they always take 
its benefit into consideration (Resp. 412c-d). A few of the guards show 
peculiar involvement in learning and examining the truth (Resp. 475c-e). 
Only they are apt to discern the existence of the eternal and perfect 
beings, thus obtaining full knowledge (Resp. 477a-b). But it is not only 
intellectual endowment which determines the possibility of having the 
highest power. Human desires and pleasures should be trained to focus 
on proper objects (Leg. 643c). The desires of the best guards are at one 
point aimed at the objects of science, and the guards gain access to 
spiritual pleasures, while bodily pleasures lose value for them. Such an 
attitude marks a person who possesses the virtue called sophrosune¯ (Resp. 
485d-e). This personality trait is, as already said, innate to some degree, 
but it has to undergo the educational treatment to become a long-lasting 
element of human nature. This means that it is necessary to fight against 
the desires and pleasures which stimulate various improper actions (Leg. 
647c-d). These are behaviours which include addiction (i.e. voluntary 
deprivation of freedom) and lack of self-control (akrateia), activities in 
which the man perpetrates an act of hubris (over-drinking, over-eating 
and every kind of over-possessing, for example) and, in addition, telling 
untruths (Ap. 17b, 31a), flattering (Ap. 38d), dishonesty, brutal com-
petition, rape and murder (Resp. 391c, 586a-b). All these actions arise 
due to a lack of knowledge and because the reason has no ruling power 
(Tht. 196d-e; Resp. 586c). To realise what sophrosune¯ is and how it is 
connected with pleasures it is necessary to show Plato’s understanding of 
human nature. 
 62 Plat. Resp. 398e; 403e. Interestingly, an impairment of cognitive abilities could 
also be significant in the case of senior citizens, because their souls are ‘rejuvenated’ 
and prone to influence. It occurs by reviving a paideia obtained in youth; Belfiore 1986, 
425-426.
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Plato says that sophrosune¯ «is surely a kind of order, the mastery of 
certain kinds of pleasures and desires»  63. An order presupposes a plural-
ity of objects (in the range of human beings in this case) and mastery 
presupposes the axiological hierarchy between the elements (Resp. 431a). 
A human being is a plurality because he or she is a spiritual and cor-
poreal compound. The metaphysical constituent rules the physical one, 
but it can also be analysed as two- or three-element structure. Some of 
Plato’s expressions suggest that the soul is composed of the rational 
and the non-rational factor, of which the former is better and should, 
therefore, govern the latter. However, one can set apart two features in 
the non-rational factor, because the factor responsible for commitment 
and enthusiasm should be distinguished from the one responsible for 
desires. The former can lean towards the higher (reason) or towards 
the lower. The lowest part of the soul desires or craves to be filled with 
pleasures, and it is most prone to hubris. It can only take place when 
the things which bring pleasure become objects and actions connected 
with the body, e.g., drinking, eating or sex (Resp. 442a-c). An excessive 
role on the part of these lower interests leads to disturbance in the soul 
and the consequence of it is opposition to the proper content of knowl-
edge, beliefs or logos (Leg. 689a-b). If the soul is moderate (sophro-n), the 
middle element would be in favour of the reason and it would accept 
that hubris is something evil and that actions according to hubris are not 
beautiful but rather shameless  64. The higher and the middle constituents 
can defy the lowest one, since humans are able to refrain from various 
improper activities. Thus it is hardly strange that moderation is the basis 
for wise and just action (Leg. 696c). If moderation consists in the appro-
priate relationship between the parts of the soul in the vertical depend-
ence pattern (superiority-inferiority), it means that every part of the soul 
takes action suitable for it, and to do what is appropriate is something 
essential for Plato’s view of justice (it may be called a spiritual justice)  65.
It is well known that there is a close connection between the ethical 
and the political in Plato’s philosophy. That is why sophrosune¯ as one 
of the virtues characterises not only the soul of a man who achieves the 
maximum of his capabilities (i.e. the state of happiness), but it is also pre-
sent in the good, just and happy state. Plato was perfectly aware of how 
difficult it is to attain the condition in both dimensions, and he therefore 
paid quite a lot of attention in his writings to the various effects of degen-
 63 Plat. Resp. 430e 6-7 (Grube - Reeve 1997); cf. Grg. 491d; Phdr. 256b.
 64 Cf. Moss 2005, 153-155.
 65 Cf. Irwin 1995, 227, 238, 250, 253, 256, 282, 295 ff.; Santas 2010, 187 ff.
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eration  66 on the structure of the soul and the polis. Some of these issues 
are connected with pleasure.
3.2. Politics: pleasure and degeneration
«Everything that has become perishes» (Resp. 546a 2) is an ontological 
principle that justifies the collapse of the perfect political system. The 
human factor is the guards who cease to recognise the so-called geometri-
cal number  67. This number served to regulate the procedures of concep-
tion in the state to produce the proper human characters. The source of 
degeneration is an enfeeblement of the rational and the increase of the 
irrational part of the soul (i.e. the proper, beautiful and good structure of 
the soul is disturbed), but one can point to a deeper cause of it. On the 
epistemological level, the ignorance of the number triggers the inability 
to hit the right time (kairos) and it probably also means that there is a 
problem with the connection between the noetic view and human action. 
Moreover, it is even possible that it can block the access to the noetic 
world  68. On the ontological level, the divergence between cosmic and 
human time is begun (in Politicus 270a Plato says that Demiurgos leaves 
the cosmos at that time). It discontinues, in effect, not only the practice 
of reviving the generations accurately, but also the process of proper 
education. There are people born with souls dominated by the middle 
part (thumoeides), but there are also the needs of the lowest part. These 
needs are still suppressed by shame, and that is why indulgence in bodily 
pleasures takes place only secretly (latharai) (Resp. 548)  69. 
The situation changes radically when love of money comes into the 
picture. It replaces love of virtue and the richest individuals begin to 
 66 One can speak about psychopathology in this case; cf. Frede 2005, 359; Solinas 
2005, 493-495.
 67 This passage is very difficult, since it is possible to construe it as a serious 
exposition (e.g. Gaca 2003), a figurative one (e.g. Adam 1907, 208) and an ironical one 
(e.g. Gow 1883; Rosen 2005, 307). It is worth stressing that the first interpretation can 
already be found in Aristotle’s criticism of Plato philosophy (Pol. 1316a). Various inter-
pretations developed until the Renaissance are presented by Allen 1994, 5-11.
 68 Campese 2005, 192-193; Dorter 2006, 233-235.
 69 The political system constituted by this type of people is called timocracy, and 
it is found in Sparta; cf. Calabi 2005; Morrow 1960, 40-63. De Brasi 2013 distinguishes 
between three forms that Plato takes with respect to the Spartan state: (1) discours cri-
tique (the dialogues until the Republic), (2) discours justificatif (the Republic, the Sophist, 
the Politicus, the Parmenides) and (3) discours descriptif (the Timaeus, the Critias, the 
Laws).
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rule the state. They are able to find joy in the works of the Muses, but 
these works are not connected with arete¯. These products can only flatter 
the human soul, but they are no temptation for a virtuous man (Resp. 
538d). The state undergoes a fundamental transformation: the citizens 
are deeply divided and antagonised (which is the greatest evil according 
to Plato) because the poor class (pto-choi) comes into being and among 
them are «the thieves, the cutpurses, the perpetrators of sacrilege and the 
originators of all-evil»  70. As far as pleasure is concerned, a person who is 
tremendously attached to their fortune has one little constraint. They will 
restrict only those pleasures which expose them to expenses, but even 
such limitation is difficult for them, which proves how far the lowest part 
of the soul has already been influenced. Indeed, they divide pleasures 
into the necessary and unnecessary so as to arrange them in a hierarchy, 
but the hierarchy is built on an inaccurate axiological basis because its 
sole criterion is financial profit and loss. 
According to Plato, the above-mentioned social and economic divi-
sion generates a conflict (stasis) among citizens: some of them want to 
get rid of the rich ones, to gain access to power and to provide equal 
access to offices (the posts start to be appointed by drawing – Resp. 
557a). The new political system which arises is called democracy and 
it is characterised as pleasant, government-less and changeable (hedeia, 
anarchos  71, poikile¯ ) (Resp. 558c). A democratic man comes into existence 
in a similar way. There is a fight between the middle and lowest parts of 
the soul, resulting in that the latter prevails over the former. In effect, the 
distinction between the necessary and unnecessary pleasures disappears. 
For equality (isote¯s), which is the fundamental value in democracy, is also 
used with regard to desires and pleasures. There is no hierarchy among 
them; they are all corporeal (Resp. 439d).
A democrat regards, then, the words ‘pleasant’, ‘free’, ‘happy’ (maka-
rios) as synonymous. They describe his or her way of life best, because all 
desires and all pleasures are allowed to be fulfilled (there are, of course, 
many different pleasures, but they all have the same value). However, 
democracy, according to Plato, is a political system without any real 
power that could stabilise the activities of the society on the basis of some 
hierarchical system of values and true knowledge. The major weakness 
of democracy is not only how the officials are elected, but also how the 
majority of political decisions are made – by a one-time consensus among 
 70 Plat. Resp. 552d; Fuks 1984, 120-121.
 71 Plato regards anarchia, hubris, dissipation (aso¯tia), shamelessness and lawless-
ness as equal (Resp. 560e; 575a).
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the active political citizens. The officials guarantee the relative stability of 
the government, but it is still quite weak because their power is restricted 
temporarily and once their job is done, they are judged by people. How-
ever, the opinion of democratic citizens is unstable because the demo-
cratic man is changeable:
And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes 
he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only 
water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other 
times, he’s idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies 
himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, 
leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his 
mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, he’s carried in that direction, if 
money-makers, in that one. There’s neither order nor necessity in his life.  72
Plato’s model of political changes assumes that this kind of instability 
and the desire for all kinds of pleasure carry with themselves the con-
sequence in the form of a further destruction of the political and social 
community (Leg. 714a). Freedom and equality break down all barriers. 
One aspires to eliminate all superior power (even that of the laws and 
customs) so that all social distinctions between people are obliterated. 
One seeks even to annihilate the difference between man and animal 
(Resp. 562e-563e). It becomes, however, only a surface equality because 
there are still various economic inequalities and the strife caused by 
them. When the conflicts accumulate and there is no possibility to solve 
them lawfully, people give power to one person in these hard times. This 
is how a tyrant and tyranny come into being. While this position entails 
privilege and popularity, it also results in a life imbued with praise and 
luxury that ultimately leads to a complete destruction of the human soul. 
The lowest part of it tyrannises the other parts; the middle part (thumos) 
is orientated only towards self-interest and the reason is employed solely 
to calculate how to fulfil all desires and avoid any distress. Interestingly, 
however, a tyrant wants to satisfy the strongest desires above all, i.e. he 
craves indulgenzce in unnecessary and bodily pleasures  73. The rationality 
of such a person is severely limited and he can, in fact, be described as a 
madman and a perfect example of extreme injustice  74.
 72 Resp. 561c 7 - d 6; Grube - Reeve 1997.
 73 Cf. Xen. Hier. 1, 1-32; Strauss 2009, 87-96.
 74 Plat. Resp. 344a; 571a-575; Leg. 863d. There is Eros in the tyrant and his actions 
can be called mania, but this is not the sense which Plato presents in the Phaedrus. The 
destroyed structure of the soul means that Eros cease to be the power that elevates the 
soul to the transcendence – the desire does not undergo the sublimation process – but it 
brings the soul down. Mania is not a passion for seeking answers to the most important 
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The degeneration of human nature is caused by a lack of proper 
education and by the fact that the natural, physical and egoistic elements 
become prevalent. Schooling and nurture (paideia) guarantee that the 
reason can develop, thumos can be in favour of reason, and both can 
get the lowest part of the soul under control. Studying enables one to 
follow Apollo’s appeal: Know thyself (gnothi sauton; nosce te ipsum) not 
to be an egoist (egoism is ‘easy’, quite ‘natural’ and it can be deepened 
or sublimed), but to be aware that most important thing is a community. 
As Plato says in the Laws, it is difficult to acknowledge that the common 
good should be more important than the individual one. The common 
good «is what knits a state together, whereas private interests make it 
disintegrate. If the public interest is well served, rather than private, then 
the individual and the community alike are benefited»  75. Plato is, how-
ever, quite pessimistic here because if there were such a unique person  76 
who could understand this, there would also be the great danger that his 
or her irrational and mortal part of the soul would result in craving for 
things in excess (pleoneksia) and pursuing solely one’s private interests 
(idiopragia  77). If this is connected with the irrational avoidance of distress 
and pursuit of pleasures, then the soul of this person and the state is cast 
into the abyss of evil (Plat. Leg. 875b 1 - c 2).
It can be seen, then, that a possible change in the human soul and 
in politics is extended from what is philosophical, selfless, correct and 
healthy to what is tyrannical, egoistic, spoiled and diseased. There are, 
of course, various middle states between the extremes, but they are to a 
greater or lesser extent absent from the happiest, most just and truly 
pleasant way of life. According to Plato, only the philosopher is in 
a position to show the appropriate hierarchy of values and the most 
questions, but merely a mental illness. Cf. Voegelin 2009, 202. Plato says in the Laws 
(888a) that madness can result either from an enormous appetite (laimargia) for pleas-
ure or from an immoderation of the middle part of the soul (thumos). For more on the 
role of Eros in the Republic, see e.g. Rosen 1965.
 75 Leg. 875a 6 - b 1; Saunders 1997.
 76 While Plato uses the noun autokrato¯r in this passage of the Laws (875b 3), the 
term literally means «autocrat», i.e. someone who is free of the external circumstances 
(like the world abandoned by Demiurgos in the Politicus 274a) and someone who exer-
cises their full power (Ep. 309b), including tyranny (Ep. 324c-d).
 77 Idiopragia means literally «to act in own, appropriate way» and it seems that it 
conveys the idea of the rule of justice that everyone does what one ought to do. This 
has already been noted in Antiquity – Gal. Inst. Log. 18, 4. Cf. Herm. in Phdr. 177, 
6; Olymp. in Phd. 2, 14; Origen. Contra Celsum. V 47; Anon. in Eth. Nic. 254, 23-24; 
Mich. in Eth. Nic. 72, 5-6; Wieland 1982, 161-162; Höffe 2005, 77. However, it should 
be emphasised that idiopragia is here connected with pleoneksia and that the prefix idio- 
concerns something private.
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pleasant life. Only he or she has the experience (empeiria)  78, prudence 
(phrone¯sis) and reason (logos) (Resp. 583e) which enable him or her to 
gain insight into the eternal world of values, to realise the values in our 
world, to transmit the hierarchy and to justify it for the co-citizens. This 
can also be applied to pleasures. The philosopher’s judgement is the 
most reliable one and he or she can show that philosophical life is most 
pleasant and far more so than that of a tyrant (Resp. 587a ff.)  79.
4. conclusion
It follows that Plato was fully aware of the significance of pleasure for 
both the individual and society. His considerations are conducted from 
two perspectives: a descriptive and a regulative one. On the one hand, he 
describes concrete situations from human life (e.g. pregnancy or exercise) 
and stresses the function of the pleasure involved in them. On the other 
hand, he also designs various recommendations which make it possible 
to regulate the way of life to make it fully ordered. The second viewpoint 
is much more distinct in his deliberations on political reality. It is per-
fectly understandable from a historical point of view because the essence 
of the human being was at that time not only to be a rational being but 
 78 The experience of the philosopher does not need to mean his or her practice 
because examples play an essential role in the process of education. The god or a sage 
is the positive model (the famous doctrine of assimilation to God [homoiosis theo]), 
but there are many situations where various non-positive examples occur, and they can 
also be useful for education. Let us take the example of drugs. The philosopher does 
not need to try them to have some experience of this kind of pleasure. He or she can 
estimate the level of pleasure by the example of someone who uses drugs. Indeed, he 
or she has no insight into the subjective aspect of this event, but words and reactions 
can perhaps signify that it might be very pleasant. This preliminary judgement should, 
however, be validated. The philosopher can take into consideration additional circum-
stances: how long this pleasure lasts and what is the state of the body and mind during 
the activity of taking drugs and the resulting condition. He or she can perceive that 
when someone is in a state of narcosis, they lose their mind, and there appear adverse 
health effects and even addiction. These observations enable him or her to reject this 
kind of pleasure as the false one. In this respect, the philosopher is experienced and 
unpractised at the same time; his or her soul has not participated in such an event, 
but the appropriate belief is acquired on the basis of an environmental observation (cf. 
Resp. 409a-c). 
 79 Plato’s mathematical argument alludes probably to the philosophy of the 
Pythagorean Philolaus; Diels - Kranz 44 A 22; cf. Adam 1907, 361; Huffman 1993, 276-
279; Dorter 2006, 298. An interesting geometrical interpretation has been presented by 
Brumbaugh 1949 and 1954, 151-160.
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also to be a political one. It can be agreed that the main problem of 
Plato’s perspective is a lack of precise psychological underpinnings  80, but 
his programme can also be read on a more general level. I believe that 
the founder of the Academy left a comprehensive set of questions con-
nected with the presence of pleasure in human existence which should 
be considered and solved by the educator and the politician: does the 
pleasure flowing from music (and other artistic works) have any educa-
tional meaning, and if so, what type of music (art), what influence does it 
have? Thus, should the educator and politician regulate the access to art 
by stipulating important criteria for its evaluation? If so, should the regu-
lation be a prohibition or a development of understanding of works of 
art (or maybe both)? How should one educate young people so that they 
are able to control their emotions and resist the wrong pleasures? Plato 
presents his answers, tries to justify them and indicates what can happen 
if the question of pleasure is resolved incorrectly. In this way, he gives the 
criteria for assessing both the individual and society. According to him, 
a person unable to control their pursuit of pleasure (and so intellectu-
ally and morally uneducated) should never become a person of public 
confidence. A society that does not differentiate between pleasures and 
opts for complete freedom in this matter cannot be considered to be in 
good governance. Even the absence of public consent to the enjoyment 
of various sources of pleasures does not mean that the society is ‘healthy’, 
because a lack of control and rationality can be present in the private 
sphere. The problems of pleasure posed by Plato also seem to be valid 
today, and their solutions and justifications, though often controversial, 
stimulate discussion.
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